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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case arises from an appeal of a summary judgment entered 
by the Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court Judge for 
Utah County, State of Utah. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
of the appeal of the summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
A. Genuine disputed material facts. 
In light of the issue of genuine disputed material facts, did 
the trial Court err in granting summary judgment for the 
Appellees/Defendants? 
The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court 
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 
627 (Utah 1994). 
B. Appellees/Defendants exercised malice in 
writing the grievance and the grievance 
demonstrated malice on its face. 
Did the trial Court err in granting summary judgment that the 
Appellees/Defendants did not write and publish the grievance with 
malice and that the grievance does not constitute legal malice 
under Utah Law? 
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The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court 
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 
627 (Utah 1994). 
C. Appellees/Defendants did not institute an 
administrative hearing therefore there is no 
governmental immunity. 
Did the trial Court err in granting summary judgment that the 
Appellees/Defendants were immune from liability because they 
initiated an administrative hearing when in fact no governmental 
entity conducted an administrative hearing? 
The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court 
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 
627 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Appellant/Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Brown") 
filed a complaint seeking damages from Appellees/Defendants 
(hereinafter referred to as "municipal employees" or by their 
individual names) for defamation per se, alleging malice. The Utah 
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Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4, does 
not protect municipal employees if they act through malice or 
fraud. The municipal employees published a grievance against Brown 
containing written statements, as opposed to allegations, that 
Brown had committed crimes, violated civil rights, and acted 
unprofessionally in his public office. The effect of the 
statements was to hold Brown up to public contempt and ridicule. 
The municipal employees responded with the argument that they 
were protected by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann., Section 63-30-10. They filed a motion for summary judgment 
based upon the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
Brown opposed the motion for summary judgment. He asserted 
that there were disputed material facts and provided affidavits 
disputing the facts of the municipal employees. 
Notwithstanding the assertion of disputed material facts, the 
Judge ruled that the municipal employees were protected by Section 
63-30-10 and, that as a matter of law, malice was not present on 
the face of the grievance. The trial Court granted the municipal 
employees' motion for summary judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Brown filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. [R. 1-12.] 
Brown filed an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. [R. 13-
36.] The municipal employees filed an Answer, Cross-claim and Jury 
Demand. [R. 43-54.] 
The municipal employees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
supported by a memorandum and supporting affidavits. [R. 83 0-892.] 
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Brown filed a Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting affidavits. [R. 916-955.] The response of 
Brown asserted that there were disputed material facts and that the 
municipal employees acted through malice. [R. 907-915.] 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Judge, heard oral 
arguments on August 13, 1999. [R. 1028.] The Court granted the 
municipal employees' Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 9, 
1999, the Court entered the Order and Summary Judgment. [R. 102 9-
1032.] 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In 1993, the citizens of American Fork City elected Brown to 
the American Fork City Council. During his term he actively 
supported three positions with which American Fork City employees 
generally disagreed: remodeling the 90-year-old Harrington School 
Building to serve as a city hall; maintaining city hall in its 
central location in town; and conducting an independent 
investigation of the police department. [R. 542.] 
Municipal employees Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary 
Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox, and 
others wanted to remove former Mayor Jess Green as Mayor of 
American Fork City before his term expired. The municipal 
employees tried to oust Green from the position of mayor. [R. 542.] 
The police investigated Green for alleged theft of a thirty-
two-cent drink from a convenience store. Someone with access to 
the records released his police investigation files to the news 
media. These allegations were extensively reported in newspapers 
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and other media sources, including national outlets. [R. 542.] 
Throughout this time, Brown supported Green as Mayor of 
American Fork City. Afterwards, because Brown supported Mayor 
Green and the positions that Brown took opposing the desires of the 
municipal employees, the municipal employees used the same tactics 
on Brown to try and remove him from office. [R. 541-542.] 
There were disputes among members of the city council in 
American Fork City regarding city business. Nevertheless, there 
were issues on which the members of the city council unanimously 
agreed. In particular, in response to Brown's request for an 
independent investigation of the American Fork Police Department, 
the city council voted unanimously on May 14, 1997, to conduct an 
independent investigation of the police. [R. 621-622.] 
In June 1997, there were two city council meetings, one on 
June 10 and the other on June 24. Both meetings dealt with the 
potential purchase of 7.5 acres of land on the west side of 
American Fork City for the purpose of relocating the city hall. 
Brown opposed the purchase of land to relocate the city hall. When 
it became evident that the effort to purchase the land would fail, 
Carl Wanlass, the City Administrator and one of the parties, whose 
responsibility was to attend all city council meetings, became so 
angry that he left the meeting before it was over and did not 
return. [R. 541.] 
Kevin Bennett, American Fork City Attorney, spoke to Brown at 
the conclusion of the city council meeting. Bennett had written a 
letter to another attorney wherein he had stated members of the 
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city council asked advice from him to oust the mayor, and the mayor 
asked advice from him to prevent the city council from ousting him 
from office. Brown had read the letter. Brown was concerned that 
Bennett had a serious conflict of interest. Brown asked Bennett 
about the conflict. Bennett became very agitated and said he was 
thinking of resigning. Brown said, "Resign tomorrow." Bennett 
became even more agitated and heated in his conversation with 
Brown. [R. 541.] 
Brown later learned that during the city council meeting on 
June 24, 19 97, Jay Christensen, a city employee, made muted 
comments but did not make any public statements. In other words, 
he did not seek recognition to speak publicly. Rather, Christensen 
sat at the rear of the city council chambers and made muted 
comments that could be heard only by the citizens who were trying 
to address the city council. Brown became aware of the muted and 
intimidating comments that Christensen voiced. Brown looked for 
Christensen on the evening of June 24, 1997, to discuss the matter 
with him but could not find him. [R. 540-541.] 
On June 25, 1997, Brown saw Christensen at the city hall and 
told him that it was inappropriate to make muted comments that 
intimidated citizens in city council meeting. Brown further told 
Christensen that if he wanted to speak in city council meetings he 
should raise his hand, be acknowledged, and speak publicly. Even 
a statement of Wanlass recognized that Brown encouraged city 
employees to attend city council meeting and participate but not 
make muted comments. [R. 585-592.] 
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Wanlass came into the city hall while Brown talked with 
Christensen. Wanlass told Brown not to not speak to the city 
employees. Brown responded by saying he could talk to any city 
employee that he desired. [R. 585-592.] 
Wanlass became belligerent toward Brown. Wanlass walked 
toward Brown and stood so close that the parties almost touched. 
Brown could see Wanlass' eyes through his dark glasses. Brown did 
not move toward Wanlass. Christensen asked Wanlass to move away 
from Brown. After an extended period of time, Wanlass did move 
away from Brown. [R. 585-5 92.] 
Brown left the building to look for the police. Brown 
perceived that he had been assaulted by Wanlass. Brown approached 
two police officers and Christensen who were standing on the 
sidewalk immediately south of the city hall. Brown told Terry Fox, 
a lieutenant on the police department and one of the parties to 
this action, that Brown wanted to file a complaint for assault. 
Fox said to go to the police department to file the complaint. 
Brown said that he couldn't right then, he had a meeting to attend, 
but he would take care of the matter in the afternoon. [R. 585-
592.] 
Brown then turned his head to look at Christensen and told 
Christensen to write down his recollections of what had happened 
and to remember that Wanlass came down the stairs toward Brown. It 
was at that time that Fox, before he said anything, suddenly lunged 
toward Christensen and Brown's left side. In the instant Brown saw 
a movement in his peripheral vision and had the perception that Fox 
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was coming toward him. Consequently, Brown lifted his left hand 
with opened palm to keep Fox from striking him. However, Fox did 
not make contact with Brown. Rather, he violently shoved 
Christensen away from Brown. As Fox was returning to his original 
position on the sidewalk, Brown inadvertently and unintentionally 
touched Fox on his left shoulder with Brown's open left hand. Fox 
told Brown not to touch him or he would arrest Brown. Brown 
responded and said, "Okay, I won't touch you, but you moved toward 
me." Neither Fox nor Officer Peterson cited Brown for assaulting 
a police officer. [R. 585-592.] 
Brown was eventually served a summons and charged with 
disorderly conduct, an infraction. The charge of disorderly 
conduct, an infraction, was dismissed with prejudice as though the 
charge had never been filed. [R. 606-607, 620.] 
On or about July 1, 1997, 45 or more employees of American 
Fork City (many signatures cannot be recognized, therefore the 
designation of John Does as parties) signed a written grievance 
against Brown in his capacity as a member of the city council. The 
grievance did not make allegations against Brown. Rather, the 
grievance made statements of fact. The statements in the grievance 
about Brown are not true. [R. 1-3.] 
The grievance stated that Brown violated freedom of speech of 
employees. Rather, Brown directed a city employee not to make 
muted comments in city council meeting. [R. 1-3, 932-933.] 
The grievance stated that Brown was abusive and threatening to 
employees and caused Pam Baldwin (now deceased), a female employee 
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to cry. Brown was not abusive and threatening to any American Fork 
City employees. Brown did not yell at Pam Baldwin, former 
secretary to the American Fork City Recorder, to the point that she 
broke down in tears. [R. 935-936.] 
Brown was inquiring about Baldwin's health and activities when 
he realized that she was adding a new item to the agenda for the 
next city council meeting at the direction of Wanlass, the American 
Fork City Administrator. Brown knew that Mayor Green did not want 
that item on the agenda. [R. 935.] 
Normally Richard M. Colburn, the American Fork City Recorder, 
personally prepared the agendas for the city council meeting, but 
Colburn was on vacation. Brown directed Baldwin to immediately 
call Mayor Green and advise him what she was doing and verify that 
he approved the new item on the agenda. Brown told Baldwin that 
the mayor did not want the new item on the agenda. Brown cautioned 
Baldwin that she should not get in the middle of a power struggle 
between Wanlass and the mayor. Brown then left to attend to some 
other business. [R. 935.] 
Subsequently, Brown returned to the office of Baldwin, who was 
on the telephone. From listening to the statements of Baldwin, 
Brown could tell that she was discussing the new item for the 
agenda. Brown knew that Wanlass had previously prepared a letter 
of reprimand for Baldwin. Brown also knew that neither the mayor 
nor Wanlass had delivered the letter of reprimand to Baldwin. 
Brown was concerned that as a consequence of Baldwin getting 
involved in the power struggle between the mayor and Wanlass that 
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one of them would give the reprimand letter to her. Consequently, 
when Brown discovered Baldwin had not been talking to the mayor 
about the agenda item, he sternly instructed her to immediately 
call the mayor and disclose the instructions from Wanlass to add 
the item to the agenda. [R. 934-935.] 
Brown then went to his own office and called Mayor Green to 
alert him to the problem with the agenda. Brown explained to the 
mayor how Baldwin was caught in the middle between the mayor and 
Wanlass. Brown asked the mayor not to give the letter of reprimand 
to Baldwin. To the best of Brown's knowledge, Pam Baldwin never 
received the letter of reprimand. [R. 919, 934.] 
Subsequently, Brown learned that Baldwin had cried because of 
the situation. Brown apologized to her if he had offended her, but 
explained to her that he did not want her in the middle of a power 
struggle between the mayor and Wanlass. [R. 934.] 
The grievance stated that Brown had committed two crimes: 
assaulting a police officer and disorderly conduct. Eventually, 
Brown was charged with disorderly conduct, an infraction. However, 
the Court dismissed the charge as though it had never been filed. 
[R. 606-607, 617.] 
The American Fork City Personnel Policies do not provide for 
administrative proceedings against members of the Governing Body. 
Wanlass was concerned about that and sent a memorandum, dated July 
2, 1997, to the city recorder and the city attorney to investigate 
if the grievance would initiate an administrative proceeding. The 
city attorney, Kevin Bennett, responded with an attorney's opinion, 
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dated July 8, 1997, that stated the grievance could not institute 
an administrative action against Brown because there is no 
provision in the personnel policy and procedures to take action 
against a member of the governing body. The governing body of 
American Fork City did not initiate any administrative hearing or 
proceeding against Brown. [R. 929-930.] 
On July 3, 1997, at 1:58 p.m. the American Fork Police 
Department made a nine minute fax transmission to The Salt Lake 
Tribune at telephone number (801) 521-9418. On the same day at 
approximately 3:00 p.m., Phil Miller, a reporter for The Salt Lake 
Tribune called Brown to ask about the police investigation 
documents. Brown did not know about a police report. [R. 578, 
615.] 
After obtaining a copy of the initial contact report from the 
police department, Brown called Miller to answer his questions. 
Miller not only had the initial contact report, but he had a 
supplemental police report, the witnesses' statements, and the 
employees' grievance against Brown. The police reports and the 
witnesses' statements were protected documents pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). Brown had 
the initial contact report, but he did not have the other records. 
During the conversation, Miller asked pointed questions about the 
initial contact report, the supplemental police report, the 
witnesses' statements, and the grievance. The resulting newspaper 
story, dated July 4, 1997, contained quotes from police reports and 
witness statements (protected records). [R. 580-581, 615.] 
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At the conclusion of the conversation, Brown asked Miller if 
he could get copies of the documents from Miller. Miller said he 
would send the copies to Brown. Subsequently, Miller changed his 
mind about sharing the records he had received from American Fork 
City. Miller sent a fax to Brown stating it was not appropriate 
for a news reporter to become a player in a story. Rather, a 
reporter should just report the news. Miller further stated that 
it would be inappropriate for him to divulge any source, or any 
documents from a source, including a document from Brown. [R. 6 0 8.] 
The Daily Herald published portions of the supplemental police 
report written by Terry Fox in an article published in July 1997, 
titled, "Cop, councilman clash." The following quotes from Fox's 
Supplemental Report were published in the article: 
"I started to walk away and Brown reached out with his 
right hand and grabbed me by the biceps on the left arm 
and pushed me with the same hand, stopping my movement," 
Fox said in a report on the incident. "I felt threatened 
at this point that Brown was going to continue the 
assault on me.7' [R. 614.] 
Between July and October of 1997, agents of The Daily Herald, 
The Salt Lake Tribune, and Deseret News acknowledged that they had 
not made GRAMA requests for the documents pertaining to Brown; 
nevertheless, the American Fork Police Department provided the 
investigation files to them. [R. 613-614.] 
Bekki Janson, a reporter for The Daily Herald, told Brown that 
John Durrant, American Fork Chief of Police, caused the initial 
police contact report, supplemental police report, and witnesses' 
statements to be faxed to her at The Daily Herald. On July 7, 
1997, The Daily Herald faxed a copy of Brown's statement to the 
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American Fork police. [R. 614-615.] 
Subsequently, Bekki Janson, reporter for The Daily Herald, 
again told Brown that Chief of Police John Durrant had caused the 
investigation records about Brown to be faxed to The Daily Herald. 
Bekki Janson independently confirmed to Mayor Jess Green that John 
Durrant caused the investigation records to be faxed to The Daily 
Herald. [R.614, 635.] 
On Wednesday, August 27, 1997, the American Fork Citizen 
published Scott Roudabush's letter to the editor. Scott Roudabush 
was present at the June 24, 1999-city council meeting. The letter 
stated in part as follows: 
In the city council meeting held on June 24, 1997, 
not all of the citizens in attendance followed rules of 
order. There are rules of order to follow when making 
comments and suggestions. Jay Christensen did not follow 
this procedure with all of his comments that night. As 
Bill Jacob made a presentation and asked some questions 
of the mayor, city council and city administrator, Mr. 
Christensen sat near the back of the room harassing Mr. 
Jacob by stating, "Let's get on with it," "Let someone 
else have a chance," "Sit down and shut up." Mr. Jacob 
sat down before he was through due to the last comment. 
These comments were made at different times and just 
loud enough for Mr. Jacob and a few others to hear. A 
person at the meeting wrote down what was said by Mr. 
Christensen. Kevin Bennett was seated next to Mr. 
Christensen and must have heard what was said. After 
Councilman Brown found out why Mr. Jacob had ended so 
abruptly, he tried to address the matter after the 
meeting and the next day in city hall. 
This is not my attempt to justify George Brown's 
actions. I know there have been ongoing problems with 
the way Councilman Brown deals with city employees. I 
have friends who are city employees. But Councilman 
Brown's actions were not in response to a city employee 
voicing legitimate concerns and/or suggestions to the 
city council. George Brown was responding to a city 
employee harassing a citizen trying to address the city 
council. (Emphasis added.) 
13 
Scott Roudabush's statement about Brown's reason for speaking to 
Jay Christensen is correct. The letter also reflects the effects 
of the defamation to the reputation of Brown. [R. 559-560, 615-
616.] 
In November 1997, William T. (Bill) Jacob, an American Fork 
citizen, made a GRAMA request to the American Fork City Recorder 
for the police investigation files about Brown. The city recorder 
provided Jacob a copy of the initial police contact report but did 
not release the supplemental police report and witnesses' 
statements. Jacob appealed the partial denial to the mayor. The 
mayor upheld the denial. American Fork City classified the 
supplemental police report written by Fox and the witnesses' 
statements as protected documents. [R. 547-551, 558-559.] 
Brown made a GRAMA request to American Fork City for 
correspondence of which he was the subject that was exchanged with 
outside entities such as the Attorney General's Office. The City 
Recorder denied the request and declared a letter from Assistant 
Attorney General Stephen H. Morrissett, dated August 4, 1997, to be 
a protected record because of attorney-client privilege. Brown 
appealed to the Mayor, who did not respond. Subsequently Brown 
appealed to the State Records Committee. The Committee upheld the 
status that the letter was a protected record. [R. 571-576, 609, 
612-613.] 
Brown appealed the decision of the State Records Committee to 
the Fourth District Court. The case is now assigned to Judge 
Stott. The letter, dated August 4, 1997, filed in this case as an 
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exhibit to the Affidavit of Morrissett in support of the municipal 
employees' Motion for Summary Judgment, is one of the protected 
records that Brown sought. [R. 612.] 
In November 1998, Marta Murvosh, a reporter for THE DAILY 
HERALD, made a GRAMA request to American Fork City. In response 
American Fork City released the supplemental police report of Terry 
V. Fox and the Morrissett letter, dated August 4, 1997. Both are 
protected records. Consequently, the city officials have released 
protected documents for publication and some have been filed in 
this case. [R. 611.] 
Utah Code Ann., Section 63-2-801, Government Records and 
Access Management Act, makes it a misdemeanor to release protected 
documents. It appears that officials of American Fork City have 
released and published protected records. [R. 434-435, 451-453, 
851, 853-854.] 
On January 27, 1999, Judge Howard F. Miatani, Fourth District 
Court Judge, signed the following Order of Dismissal With Prejudice 
pertaining to the disorderly conduct charge filed by American Fork 
City against Brown: 
Based upon the Motion of Defendant and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED that the 
Information against the Defendant in the above captioned 
case is hereby Dismissed, with Prejudice, as if the 
charge had never been filed as provided in U.C.A., 
Section 77-2-7. [R. 562, 606-607.] 
Brown filed a Complaint alleging that the municipal employees 
defamed him per se by writing and publishing the grievance to third 
parties. Brown alleged that the municipal employees published the 
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grievance with malice. The municipal employees filed a motion for 
summary judgment with supporting affidavits. Brown filed opposing 
memoranda with supporting affidavits. There were genuine disputed 
material facts identified in the opposing memoranda and supported 
by the affidavits. Notwithstanding the disputed material facts, the 
trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the municipal 
employees. [R. 501-622, 631-638, 902-955.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Clearly, the record is full of disputed facts. They are 
genuine disputes of material facts. Notwithstanding the disputed 
facts set forth in the memoranda and affidavits opposing the 
municipal employees' motion for summary judgment, the trial Court 
granted the summary judgment. The Court of Appeals should reverse 
the summary judgment because of the disputed material facts and 
remand the case for trial before a jury. 
Assuming there were no disputed material facts and the facts 
are viewed favorably to Brown, the Court of Appeals must conclude 
the municipal employees, in writing the defamatory grievance, acted 
with malice in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4, and 
they are personally liable for the resulting defamation of Brown. 
The Court of Appeals should also rule that, on its face with its 
defamatory per se statements, the written grievance constitutes 
legal malice under Utah law. 
The municipal employees argue that, since they filed the 
grievance to institute an administrative hearing against Brown, they 
are protected by governmental immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
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Section 63-30-10. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals should rule 
that since the grievance did not result in an administrative 
hearing, the municipal employees are not protected by governmental 
immunity. The Court of Appeals should reverse the summary judgment 
and remand this case with appropriate instructions for trial before 
a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN LIGHT OF GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS, THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE 
APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS. 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibits a trial 
court from granting summary judgment if there are disputed material 
facts. 
(c) . Motion and proceedings thereon. . . . The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
As argued before the trial Court, there are genuine issues of 
disputed material facts. Consequently, the trial Court should not 
have granted the municipal employees' motion for summary judgment. 
A trial court should only grant a summary judgment if there is no 
genuine disputed issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Drysdale v. Ford Motor 
Co. , 1994 P. 2d 678 (Utah 1997) . Consequently, the Court of Appeals 
must remand this case to the trial Court to present the genuine 
issues of disputed material facts to the fact finder. 
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review 
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conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments 
do not resolve factual issues, the appellate court reviews those 
conclusions for correctness, without according deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions, Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989); Daniels v. Deseret Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 
1100 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989); 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 
P.2d 24 (1990); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 
811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991) . 
Summary judgment is a harsh remedy. Consequently, disposition 
of a case on summary judgment denies the losing party the benefit 
of a trial on the merits. The appellate court must review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and should 
affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 
P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hunt v. ESI Eng'g, Inc., 808 P.2d 
1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial 
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Court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion 
that there are no material fact issues. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. 
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on the 
other side of controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding 
summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
The presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows the 
granting of a summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 
562 P. 2d 238 (Utah 1977). Brown filed a memorandum, with supporting 
affidavits [R. 902-955.], opposing the municipal employees' motion 
for summary judgment. In the memorandum and affidavits opposing the 
motion for summary judgment, Brown set forth numerous disputed 
facts. Many more than just one averment of a single disputed fact. 
The order granting summary judgment [R. 129-132.], did not address 
all of the disputed facts, but addressed only what the Court 
designated as undisputed facts and ignored the other disputed facts. 
The trial Court erred in granting the summary judgment when 
there were disputed material facts. The Court of Appeals should 
reverse the summary judgment and remand this case for trial before 
a j ury. 
II. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE POSITION THAT THE 
APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS DID WRITE AND PUBLISH THE GRIEVANCE 
WITH MALICE AND THAT THE GRIEVANCE DOES CONSTITUTE MALICE 
UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 
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248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). The appellate court accords no deference to a trial 
court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary 
judgment, but reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. 
Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
In the Order and Summary Judgment entered by the trial Court, 
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions Of Law states as follows: 
3. As a separate and independent ground for 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants, 
the Court concludes that under Section 63-30-4(3) (b) this 
action against the employee defendants is barred, because 
there is no evidence in the record that the employee 
defendants "acted or failed to act through fraud or 
malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute 
legal malice under Utah law. [R. 1030.] 
Malice, in regards to defamation, has been defined as (1) 
knowledge that a statement was false; or (2) reckless disregard of 
whether a statement was true or false, which means that the 
defendant acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable 
falsity of the statement, or that, at the time the statement was 
transmitted, the defendant had serious doubts that the statement was 
true. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App. 
1992); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4726, 473 
(June 20, 1991); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 
1983) ; Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1980) ; Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 
324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130 (1967); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
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254 (1964) . 
The grievance, dated July 1, 1997, states on its face that 
Brown committed criminal acts. The grievance states in part as 
follows: 
. At issue is the assault committed by Councilman 
George Brown upon Lieutenant Terry Fox . . . Councilman 
Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to 
intimidate him and control the information release in the 
report of disorderly conduct and assaultive behavior by 
Brown. . . . We Grieve the fact that Councilman George 
Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102-Disorderly 
Conduct, 76-5-102.4-Assault against a peace officer, . . 
. [R. 3.] . 
The grievance states, instead of alleging, on its face that Brown 
violated Utah Code Ann., Sections 76-5-102.4 and 76-9-102, and, 
therefore, Brown committed the crimes of disorderly conduct and 
assault against a peace officer. These statements, if false, are 
defamation per se. 
The grievance also states, instead of alleging, on its face 
that Brown harassed female employees. It states in part as follows: 
. . . At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown 
has focused his repeated demeaning behavior against 
female staff employees of American Fork City. That he 
takes pleasure in making ridiculing, demeaning, and 
coercing statements towards female staff in an effort to 
creat [sic] a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work 
environment for them. [R. 2.] 
Libel per se has been defined as follows: 
A statement is libelous per se if it is comprised of 
language which by its nature necessarily must, or 
presumably will, as a natural and proximate cause, 
occasion pecuniary loss or actual injury whether or not 
any such pecuniary loss or actual injury actually 
occurred. Actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket 
pecuniary loss but may include impairment of reputation 
or standing in the community, personal humiliation, 
anxiety, shame, mortification, and mental anguish and 
suffering. (Emphasis added.) 
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Slander per se has been defined as follows: 
For a statement to be slanderous per se, it must fall 
within one of the following four categories: (1) a charge 
that the plaintiff is guilty of criminal conduct; (2) a 
charge that the plaintiff suffers from a loathsome 
disease; (3) a charge that the plaintiff is guilty of 
conduct that is incompatible with the exercise of lawful 
business, tradef profession, or office; and (4) a charge 
that the plaintiff, if a woman, is guilty of unchastity. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979); Western States Title Ins. 
Co. v, Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966) ; Nichols v. Daily 
Reporter Co. , 30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573 (1905); and Gertz v. Welch, 418 
U.S. 323 (1974) . 
On July 1, 1997, the date of the grievance, Brown had not been 
charged with any violation of criminal statutes. Subsequently, 
American Fork City charged Brown with disorderly conduct, an 
infraction. American Fork City never charged Brown with assault 
against a police officer. However, the Court dismissed, with 
prejudice, the charge of disorderly conduct, an infraction. These 
facts were in the record before the trial Court at the time he 
granted the summary judgment. [R.562-563, 606-607, 931.] 
Brown filed a Complaint and an Amended Complaint that stated 
the municipal employees had defamed him per se and that they acted 
with malice. [R. 1-12, 13-36.] He also filed affidavits that 
supported the position that the municipal employees acted with 
malice. [R. 917-955.] 
A. Municipal employees are personally liable for malice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed municipal employees being 
liable for fraud or malice. DeBrv v.Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 1995 Utah 
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LEXIS 4 (Utah 1995); Maddocks v. Salt Lake Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 
(Utah 1987); and Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Madsen, 658 P.2d at 632-633, states as follows: 
He [governmental employee] cannot be sued in his personal 
capacity because § 63-30-4 precludes personal liability 
of a government employee for acts or omissions occurring 
during the performance of his duties, unless the employee 
"acted or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud 
or malice." Since plaintiffs' complaint makes no such 
allegations, its dismissal as to defendant Borthick was 
proper, (Emphasis added.) 
DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 1995 LEXIS 4 (Utah 1995) states 
as follows: 
Thus, even though the governmental agency cannot be 
liable, an employee who commits fraud in the course of 
his employment can be held personally liable. See Madsen 
I, 658 P.2d at 632-33; Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
740 P.2d 1337, 1339-40 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis added.) 
If an employee can be personally liable for fraud, she can also 
be personally liable for malice. Brown alleged in the Complaint and 
the Amended Complaint that the municipal employees acted through 
malice. Moreover, the motions also clearly addressed malice. Brown 
introduced malice to the Court. Indeed, the trial Court made a 
ruling on the issue of malice. This is one of the main issues 
before this appellate court. The Court of Appeals should provide 
a ruling that municipal employees can be liable for malice. 
B. Innocent until proven guilty. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-1-501 states in part as follows: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted. 
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Brown was, by law, presumed to be innocent of all criminal charges 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Two of the people 
signing the grievance and parties to this case, Terry Fox and Gary 
Caldwell, are members of the American Fork Police Department, and 
Fox was a lieutenant. These police officers have a duty of 
confidentiality as established by GRAMA. They also should be aware 
of an accused's presumption of innocence. 
The contrast of the provisions of Section 76-1-501 to the 
brass, bold statements on the face of the grievance that Brown 
committed crime is sufficient to establish that the municipal 
employees acted with malice. Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4 does 
not protect the municipal employees if they act with malice, even 
if the municipality could not be liable. 
C. Protected records released to news media and 
the Court. 
Included in the record is the news article that was published 
in The Salt Lake Tribune on July 4, 1997. [R. 921-922.] The article 
makes reference to police reports and statements of the witnesses. 
These reports and statements are protected documents pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), Utah Code 
Ann., Section 63-2-304. Other members of the news media stated that 
they received protected records from American Fork City about the 
criminal investigation against Brown. [R. 613, 615, 635.] 
The police reports and the witness statements were protected 
records. William T. Jacob made a GRAMA request for the police to 
investigation records about Brown. American Fork City denied his 
request pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-2-304(9) . [R.558, 634-
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635.] Nevertheless, the records found their way into the hands of 
the news media. There is a record that the American Fork Police 
Department faxed the police investigation files to the Salt Lake 
Tribune. [R. 578, 615, 635.] Four protected records were filed in 
this case: the August 7, 1997 correspondence of Assistant Attorney 
General Stephen Morrissett, the supplemental police report of Terry 
Fox, the witness statement of Carl Wanlass, and the witness 
statement of Jay Christensen. [R. 434-435, 451-453, 851, 853-854.] 
Release of these records could result in criminal sanctions pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann., Section 63-2-801, for the party who released the 
records. Potentially criminal behavior certainly demonstrates 
malice. 
All of this information is in the record and was before the 
trial Court when he made the decision to grant summary judgment 
against Brown. There is adequate evidence before the Court of 
Appeals to determine that the trial Court erred in holding that the 
grievance on it face did not demonstrate malice. 
D. View facts favorable to Appellant/Plaintiff. 
On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom the 
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts 
presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefromf 
considered in a light most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Young v. Texas Co. , 8 Utah 
2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 
Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960); Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 
353 P.2d 909 (1960); Allen's Prods. Co. v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 
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P.2d 93 (1966); Pioneer Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pioneer Fin. & Thrift 
Co., 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H 
Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991); 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the 
losing party below. In determining whether those facts require, as 
a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
III. THE APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS DID NOT INSTITUTE AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING THEREFORE THEY DO NOT HAVE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. 
The memorandum, dated July 2, 1997, from Carl Wanlass to the 
Governing Body, City Recorder, and City Attorney (Civil) [R.926.], 
states as follows: 
Attached is a copy of a grievance letter addressed to 
myself. What direction should be pursued in this matter 
is unchartered in that to my knowledge the city has never 
been faced to address an issue such as the one presented. 
Under the city's personnel policy grievance matters are 
directed through the City Recorders [sic] Office, 
however, I don't personally believe that this is 
applicable in this situation. I am therefore, requesting 
that the City's Recorder and Attorney (Civil) do some 
research and advice [sic] the Governing Body and myself 
accordingly. If ethically or legally there is [sic] 
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certain procedures the City must follow the City will 
comply, otherwise I assume disposition of this matter 
would be at the discretion [sic] of the Governing Body. 
Thereafter on July 8, 1997, Kevin Bennett, the city attorney 
for civil matters, in response to the memorandum of Wanlass, 
presented his attorney's opinion [R. 924.], in which Bennett stated 
as follows: 
. . our [American Fork City's] personnel policies do 
not apply to members of the governing body. 
Councilmen, then, are exempted from the nonexempt 
personnel policy (and thus not covered thereby); and are 
not included in the coverage of the exempt personnel 
policy. Neither applies — which includes any grievance 
procedure set forth thereunder. 
The governing body did not take any action. There was no 
administrative hearing. The municipal employees did not institute 
a formal grievance hearing. There was no authority to initiate an 
administrative proceeding pursuant to the American Fork City 
Personnel Policies and Procedures. There are no state statutes that 
give the municipal employees the authority to initiate an 
administrative hearing to grieve their concerns about Brown. A 
governmental official with authority to initiate an administrative 
had to act to institute a hearing. There was no authority to 
institute an administrative hearing. Consequently, the municipal 
employees did not institute an administrative hearing. 
In the absence of the criteria for immunity of instituting an 
administrative hearing, the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann., Section 63-3-10, cannot apply. The municipal employees are 
liable for their actions if they act with malice. Therefore, the 
municipal employees are liable for their defamation of Plaintiff, 
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4. 
The Court of Appeals must view the facts favorable to Brown. 
When the facts are viewed favorably to Brown, it is obvious that the 
municipal employees did not institute an administrative hearing; 
notwithstanding their desire to institute a hearing. In the absence 
of an administrative hearing, the Court of Appeals should hold that 
the municipal employees do not have governmental immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the summary judgment 
granted by the trial Court and remand this case, with instructions 
that municipal employees can be liable for malice, to a jury for 
trial. The Court of Appeals should also award costs to Brown. 
Respectfully submitted this S\ day of April, 2000. 
G'eorge <B. Brown, Jur. 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
Attorney Pro Se 
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ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants Wanlass, Hansen, 
Caldwell, Walker, Thomas, Smith and Fox 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., 
Plaintiff, ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
CARL WANLASS, DEBBIE HANSEN, 
GARY CALDWELL, CINDY WALKER, 
SHAUNA THOMAS, KEN SMITH, 
TERRY V. FOX, MARTA MURVOSH, 
MICHAEL PATRICK, THE DAILY 
HERALD, a corporation, and THE 
PULITZER COMMUNITY 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 75, 
Defendants. 
On August 13,1999, the Court heard argument on defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Andrew M. Morse, of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, appeared for the defendants 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Civil No. 980404712 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna Thomas, Ken Smith, 
Terry V. Fox, and Karen M. Siirola appeared as co-counsel for plaintiff, attorney George E. 
Brown, Jr. The Court reviewed the memoranda and affidavits, and heard arguments of counsel. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
In addition to the undisputed facts set forth in the defendants' Memorandum supporting 
their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court determines that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. Defendants Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna 
Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox at all relevant times were employees of American Fork City 
Incorporated, a Utah governmental entity. 
2. In July 1997, the defendant employees, along with 37 others, signed a grievance 
concerning plaintiff. 
3. Each statement in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to the 
defendants' employment. 
4. Each statement in the grievance raised concerns of the defendants solely in their 
capacities as employees of American Fork City. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that three 
separate and independent provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act bar plaintiffs claims 
against the defendants. 
-2-
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) bars claims arising out of 
"libel, slander, abuse of process" and "infliction of mental anguish." This provision bars both 
Count 1 (Defamation) and Count 2 (Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress) of plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
2. As a separate and independent ground for dismissing plaintiffs claims against the 
defendants, the Court concludes that the grievance was the initiation of an administrative 
proceeding against the plaintiff and consequently, the defendants are immune under § 63-3-10(5), 
which bars claims arising out of "the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable causes." 
3. As a separate and independent ground for dismissing plaintiffs Complaint against 
the defendants, the Court concludes that under § 63-30-4(3)(b) this action against the employee 
defendants is barred, because there is no evidence in the record that the employee defendants 
"acted or failed to act through fraud or malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute 
legal malice under Utah law. 
The Court concludes that fraud was not pled within the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the elements and circumstances constituting fraud were not 
stated with particularity. Any allegation of fraud, therefore, fails as a matter of law. 
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ORDER 
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the defendants' Motion and Memoranda, the 
Court grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses the plaintiffs claims 
with prejudice and on the merit. 
DATED this ^ day of-^ttjgsr, 1999. 
Approved as to Form: 
By: 
BY THE COURT 
Gary D. Stott</District Court Judge 
t" " * T, 
George E. Brown, Jr. 
Attorney Pro Se 
Karen M. Siirola 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
N \19491\3\MC\ORDER MSJ 
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AMERICAN FORK CITY 
OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATE^£ 
801-763-3000 C ^ ^ ' C o ^ 
MEMORANDUM Deputy 
TO: GOVERNING BODY, CITY RECORDER, CITY ATTORNEY 
(CIVIL). 
DATE: JULY 2, 1997 
SUBJECT: 'GRIEVANCE LETTER 
Attached is a copy of a grievance letter addressed to 
myself. What direction should be pursued in this 
matter is uncharted in that to my knowledge the city 
has never been faced to address an issue such as the 
one presented. 
Under the city's personnel policy grievance matters are 
directed through the City Recorders Office, however, I 
don't personally believe-that this is applicable in 
this situation. I am therefore, requesting that the 
City's Recorder and Attorney (Civil) do some research 
and advice the Governing Body- and myself accordingly. 
If ethically or legally there is certain procedures the 
City must follow the City will comply, otherwise I 
assume disposition of this matter would be at the 
discreation of the Governing Body. 
Carl T. Wanlass, CPA 
City Administrator 
47 , i \ L ±*> 
To: Carl Wanlass STATE"CFITM*7 
UTAH co : ;W 
From: American Fork City Employees, Departments in Ghnefel \l Q0 PU tnn 
Date: July 1,1997 
RE: Grievance 
This memo is forwarded with the intent to pursue resolution by grievance the following 
matters: 
At issue is the matter of Councilman George Brown violating employees rights to 
freedom of speech in that he did threaten and intimidate an employee of American Fork 
City for exercising his right as a citizen to voice an opinion in an open City Council 
meeting. That in doing so BROWN has created a hostile environment for all city 
employees who would comment on city issues in open forum where opinions over such 
matters are invited from the public and other interested parties. That all city employees 
must now be fearful of retaliation for expressing their views and beliefs in invited open 
forum if those views and beliefs are contrary to those held by Councilman George 
Brown. 
At issue is the assault committed by Councilman George Brown upon Lieutenant Terry 
Fox pursuant to an investigation Lieutenant Fox had undertaken concerning the 
disorderly conduct of George Brown on 6/25/97 in American Fork City Hall. George 
Brown had attempted to "browbeat" and incite confrontation with American Fork City 
Employees in a public place. When he attempted to coerce an employee into giving a 
statement to police that was favorable to Brown, Lieutenant Fox rightly corrected 
Brown, advising Brown not to tell the employee what to write in the statement. 
Councilman Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to intimidate him and 
control the information release in the report of disorderly conduct and assaultive 
behavior by Brown. At issue is the fact that ail American Fork City Employees must 
now be fearful of assaultive behavior from Councilman George Brown if their views and 
actions are contrary to the views and beliefs of George Brown. 
At issue is the repeated threats of termination from employment of American Fork City 
Employees by Councilman George Brown. On numerous occasions George Brown has 
threatened termination of employment or has told employees to "resign" because the 
employee has disagreed with Browns opinions, views; or politics. 
Further, Brown has repeatedly violated American Fork Policy and Procedure 
concerning personnel problems. Brown has repeatedly degraded, embarrassed, 
demeaned, and insulted American Fork City employees in open public forum, in public 
places, and in front of fellow city workers exposing American Fork City employees to 
public humiliation and contempt. 
FYHTRTT A 
At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown has focused his repeated 
demeaning behavior against female staff employees of American Fork City. That he 
takes pleasure in making ridiculing, demeaning, and coercing statements towards 
female staff in an effort to creat a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work environment 
for them. 
We, therefore, issue complaint, and grieve the above listed issues and seek relief under 
section IX of American Fork City Policy and Procedure. We Grieve the fact that 
Councilman George Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102- Disorderly 
Conduct, 76-5-102.4- Assault against a peace officer, and American Fork City Policy 
and Procedures Section VII (C)(2)- Indulging in Offensive Conduct. 
Expected Resolution: We demand that American Fork City Councilman George 
Brown be reprimanded by the body of City Council. That he be advised that his 
conduct has adversely affected the efficiency, harmony, and good order of American 
Fork City employees, and that his actions could reasonably cause the public to lose 
confidence in American Fork City Government We demand that American Fork City 
Councilman George Brown, when acting in his capacity as a representative of American 
Fork City government, be courteous and civil with the public and American Fork City 
Employees. That he not use abusive, indecent, course, harsh, loud, or profane 
language in any public place, and shall not expose City employees to public humiliation 
and contempt. That he refrain from physically assaultive and intimidating behavior. 
This Complaint and Grievance in no way limits individual persons from seeking redress 








CARL T. WANLASS. CPA. 
City Administrator 
RICHARD M. COLBORN, Recorder 
PAMELA D. HUNSAKER, Treasurer 
JO>(IN DURRANT, Chief of Police 
HOWARD DENNEY, City Engineer 
TUCKER HANSEN, City Attorney Crii 
KEVIN BENNETT, City Attorney Civtf 
JulyS, 1997 
Memo to City Recorder 
From City Attorney (Civil). 
RE: Grievance against Councilman Brown 
< 
1. You requested an opinion as to whether or not the City's personnel policies applied to Councilman 
Brown and the processing of the grievance recently brought against him by a number of City employees 
(including referral of the grievance to an appeals board). 
2. I have reviewed the grievance, as well as our personnel policies, and am of the opinion that our 
personnel policies do not apply to members of the governing body. 
a. The nonexempt personnel policy specifically exempts from its application a number of 
persons or groups of persons, including-first of all-elected officials. 
b. Looking to the exempt personnel policy, then, I find that it lists those specifically covered by 
the exempt personnel policy. Conspicuously absent is any reference to elected officials. 
c. Counciimen, then, are exempted from the nonexempt personnel policy (and thus not covered 
thereby); and are not included in the coverage of the exempt personnel policy. Neither applies-which 
includes any grievance procedure set forth thereunder. 
d. That makes sense-inasmuch as an appeals board comprised of employees and officials would 
lack the power to take disciplinary action against a Councilman. At best, even if one of the respective 
personnel policies indicated that it did apply to grievances against members of the City Council, it would 
seem that the only thing such an appeals board could do would be to recommend action to the City 
Council-the only City entity that could take any action, however limited, on such a grievance. 
e. It appears that referral to a board established by an inapplicable personnel policy and lacking 
the power to impose sanctions against elected officials is neither contemplated nor necessary. 
3. Due to a possible conflict of interest in this matter,.however, I refrain from providing advice as to 
how the grievance should or might be handled by the City. 
cc: Mayor, City Council, and Citv AdminiQtratnr 
J W r t a m Jffnrk ffltig 
^Incorporate Junr A, 1853 
S t a i r of liinl] 
JESS GREEN, MAYOR 
31 JJortfj Cfjurcf; Street 
American Jorfc. Wlafi $4003 
(SOiJ 7*53-3000 
# 
Letters to the editor Citizen - Wednesday, August 27, 1997 
About those ,comments, 
Editor: 
A couple of things concern me. I tlunk it 
is important to identify the reason 
Councilman Blown approached city 
employees on June 25 about Jay 
Christensen's "comments" during the coun-
cil meeting from the night before. And the 
idea that because the city council is made 
up of elected officials they have carte 
blanche to vote however they want is ludi-
crous. It has been made to look like Mr. 
Cliristensen was being attacked by 
Councilman Brown for voicing lus opinion 
as a citizen and city employee, but that's 
not exactly'what the issue was the night of 
the meeting. 
First, as citizens of American Fork we 
all have an interest in the way the mayor, 
city council and city employees make deci-
sions and spend the taxpayers* money and 
other revenue that is supposed to benefit 
the city and its citizens. 
City officials and employees have a spe-
cial interest in certain actions that can be 
taken by the mayor and city, council as it 
will directly affect their working environ-
ment and/or wages they earn. 
If they support each other in their pur-
suits, whether those pursuits are fiscally 
responsible or not, then they all benefit. . 
I'm not implying that the citizens 
wouldn't benefit from some of those pur-
suits, but city officials and employees 
receive additional benefits And remember, 
the mayor and city council vote and 
approve expenditures, and the city employ-
ees provide at least 600-plus votes in city 
elections. 
In the city council meeting held on June 
24, 1997. not all of the citizens in atten-
dance followed rules of order. There are 
rules of order to follow when making com-
ments .and suggestions. Jay Christen6en 
did not follow this procedure with all of lus 
comments that night. As Bill Jacob made a 
presentation and asked some questions of 
the mayor, city council and city adminis-
trator, Mr. Christensen sat near the back of 
the room harassing Mr. Jacob by stating, 
"Let's get on with it," "Let someone else 
have a chance/*"Sit down and shut up." Mr. 
Jacob sat down before he was through due 
to the last comment. 
These comments were made at different 
times and just loud enough for Mr. JacoB^ 
and a few others to hear. A person at the 
meeting wrote down what was said by Mr. 
Cliristensen. Kevin Bennett was seated 
next to Mr. Cliristensen and must have 
heard what was said. After Councilman 
Brown'found out why Mr. Jacob had ended 
so abruptly, he tried to address the matter 
after the meeting and the next day in city 
hall. 
Tlus is not my attempt to justify George 
Brown's actions. I know there have been 
ongoing problems . with the way 
Councilman Brown deals with city employ-
ees. I have friends who are city employees. 
But Councilman Brown's actions were'not 
in response to a city employee voicing legit-
imate concerns and/or suggestions to the 
city council. George Brown was responding 
to a city employee harassing a citizen try-
ing to address the city council. 
My other issue is the attitude some of 
the councilmen have taken concerning 
their elected official status. The majority of 
the city council has supported bonding that 
would not need to be brought to a bond 
election for the city's involvement in the 
Woodbury Project near K-MarL_Their 
rationale has been that they were elected 
to act for the citizens of American Fork, so 
a bond election isn't necossary. Yes, you 
have been elected to act for the City of 
American Fork and its citizens, but you 
have not been elected to act without regard 
to the citizens' opinions and concerns. I 
appreciate the fact they changed their 
minds on the other four land and building 
issues, but it appears a few of them 
reversed their direction only after they felt 
politically threatened. 
Good government is usunlly responsive 
to its citizens and operates in the open. I 
know we should be moving forward, but 
until the city council quits adhering to the 
letter of the law only, and begins to follow 
the 6pirit and intent of the law also, then 
issues like these will continue to occur and 
be a problem. , 
—Scott Roudabush 
top, councilman cl 
merican Fork police officer felt 'threatenec 
By BEKKI JANSON 
The Daily Herald 
" E R I C A N FORK — Lt. 
Fox of the American Fork 
ce Depa r tmen t ha s filed 
ult against American Fork 
icilman George Brown. 
le alleged incident 
rred Wednesday after 
^n and Fox got into a heat-
scussion over the handling' 
separate assault case. 
s tarted to walk away, and 
n reached out with his 
hand and grabbed me by 











going to G e o r g e B r o w n 
lue the assaul t on me." 
t Brown, an attorney, sees 
erently. He says the phys-
mtact was minute. 
i were all s tanding close 
h t h a t anybody could 
have reached out to touch 
someone else," Brown said. 
"When he (Fox) moved towards 
me, I pu t my hand up and it 
touched his shoulder. That 's all 
there was to it." 
Although Fox wasn' t in uni-
form a t the time, Brown said he 
wasn't about to challenge some-
one who was armed. 
Two other people were pre-
sent; J a son Peterson, an 
American Fork police officer, 
and Jay Cfyristihsen, American 
Fork Oity*erh&£gency services 
director. Chrfstehsen placed the 
call th'at brougltt Fox and 
Pet&B0Art0%h'e scene. 
Both Chr i s tensen a n a 
Peterson agree wi th Fox's 
(I&s^rlbtion of the incident. 
/*ttfmA report about the inci-
$31$ p e r s o n said the alleged 
assaul t occurred when Brown 
wallc^cl toward Chr i s tensen 
a n d y b x stepped between them., 
Peterson said Brown then 
grabbed Fox by the a rm to push 
him but of the way. j U tha t 
point, Fox told Brown not^ to 
touch h im or" he] would be 
arrested, Peterson said. ' 
Al though Fox could have 
See CLASH, A8 
CLASH 
Continued from A l 
at tes ted Brown on the spot, he 
said he decided to let the coun-
cilman walk away. 
"As an officer of the peace, 
you have to make a decision to 
file a report or make a physical 
at rest," Fox said. "If it was any-
one else I would have arrested 
them, but he is a councilman. 
T v e never had anything to 
do with him. I was sent there as 
par t of my job. This is the first 
time I've had a confrontation 
with Brown." 
Still, the incident surprises 
Mayor Jess Green — no 
stranger to controversy himself. 
Green and the city council 
have been a t odds over a num-
ber of issues, including the 
mayor's writing of a letter on 
city stationery asking a judge 
for leniency on behalf of a 
drunk driver. 
"It is very unusual to file a 
grievance of this nature," Green 
said. "1 have : ver witnessed 
any th ing of this n a t u r e by 
councilman Brown." 
Wednesday's incident 
temmed from a series of con-
versations Brown had at City 
Hall with several city employ-
ees regarding his t reatment of 
' by Brown 
Christensen said he walked 
in on a discussion between 
Brown and Cindy Walker, a city 
employee. Chris tensen said 
Brown then questioned him 
about Christensen's remarks a t 
the council meeting the previ-
ous night. 
During the discussion, City 
Adminis t ra tor Carl Wanless 
walked over and asked Brown 
not to bother the staff. After 
Brown went to a different area 
of the building, Christensen 
then made the call to the police 
department . 
"Between his being loud and 
my being loud in a public build-
ing. Wanless came to ask 
Geoi/,'e not to bother the staff," 
Christensen said. "Brown told 
Wanless to make him, and I 
thought something physical 
was going to happen so I went 
into the office and called the 
police." 
Chr is tensen waited for 
police to arrive. He was talking 
with Fox and Peterson outside 
City Hall when Brown walked 
up and joined the conversation. 
Brown inquired about filing 
an assau l t report against 
Wanless for his previous behav-
ior in City Hall. According to all 
reports and an affidavit written 
by Brown, police told Brown to 
Moments later, Brown < 
Christensen to file a repc 
what he had seen in City 
but Fox told Brown not to 
ence Christensen and \vh 
might write in his report. 
It was at tha t point tha 
alleged assaul t occurred. 
The charges are being ii 
tigated by the Utah Co 
Sheriff's Office. Possible pt 
ties will be addressed aftei 
investigation is complete. 
The Salt Lake Tribune UTAH Friday, July 4,1997 
Councilman Accused of Assaulting Cop 
In Ruckus at American Fork City Hall 
BY PHIL MILLER 
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
AMERICAN FORK — So much for civili-
ty. 
Just six weeks after the city's fractious 
government pledged to get along better, 
Councilman George Brown, the embattled 
mayor's lone ally-on the City Council, has 
been accused of assaulting a police officer, 
throwing a City Hall tantrum and brow-
beating city employees. 
A formal grievance, signed by more than^ 
three dozen city employees, has been filed~ 
with City Administrator Carl Wanlass ask-
ing that the councilman be reprimanded 
for a June 24 disturbance at American 
Fork's City Hall in which police were sum-
moned. And a police report has been for-
warded to the Utah County Attorney's Of-
fice for investigation. 
Brown denied Thursday that he ever act-
ed inappropriately or even raised his voice 
during the incident, and claimed reports to 
the contrary are being trumped up to dis-
credit him and divert attention from ongo-
ing city controversies. 
"This is all part of a grand setup," said 
Brown, the only councilman to takje Mayor 
Jess Green's side in his year-old feud with 
the city's Poljce Department. 
According to Jay Chnstensen, the city's 
ambulance captain, Brown confronted him 
June 25 at City Hall and loudly berated him 
for speaking up in the previous nightjs City 
Council meeting. "He started pointing fin-
gers at me and said, 'You have no right to 
make derogatory statements in a fCity 
Council meeting,' " Christensen said 
Thursday. 
When Wanlass approached and told 





Brown to stopryelling*atpity em-
ployees, , .Christensen recounted, 
"Brown said, ''Why don't you, 
make me.1'. . . He^just lost it. I 
felt threatened;and thought pos-
siblyUhere "would'be some'physi-
cal things going on." He called po-
lice. 
But Brown, who saidihe simply 
was asking Christensen not to 
mutter insults that could intimi-
date -residents^'during .'meetings, 
asserted. that "Wanlass' was Uhe 
threatening1 one.' 
"Carl [Wanlass] told Jay [Chris-
tensen] not to talk.to me, but I told 
him I could talk,to-any city em-
ployee. He'[Wanlass]'came down 
the stairs and'walked very>menac-
ingly.toward,me;n said the,coun-
cilman. "J-.<could see' he was ex-
tremelyangry." 
Christenserflef tand was met on 
the sidewalk .by police Lt. Terry 
Fox, who.-asked.him what was 
happening.,Moments later,.Brown 
left City.Hall'andiapproached the 
men, by then joined by police Of-
ficer Jason Petersen. 
According to Foxls police -re-
port filed^ that* afternoon, Brown 
started to tell Christensen what to 
putin his'statement to poUce, un-
til Fox interrupted and told Chris-
tensen togo to.the Police«Depart-
ment. When.Fox started;to walk 
away, he said, Brown grabbed him 
by the armband ..pushed•*him 
around;sotthey were facing.again. 
'T-.thoughts IHere* he^comes. 
This,,was<a man-who.was-out of 
control,' " ,Fox said, Thursday. 
"That's-an assault. That's-when 
you make an arrest and put him in 
handcuffs.", 
Instead, ,,Fox!'s police report 
said, he ordered Brown to, let him 
go and never touch him again. 
"J could tell.by the look on„his 
face he realized,he-had assaulted 
a police; officer," Fox said. "His 
face;went .white, like 4Oh, what 
have I done?'" 
Brown denied ever grabbing 
the police lieutenant. He. - Fox 
lunged at him while he talked to 
Christensen. Brown ,saw the 
movement out of the corner of ;his 
eye^  and,instinctively .put 'up" his 
opVn leftt ha'nd to" avoid contact, 
the;councilman said. In.doing so, 
Brown said, he barely brushed the 
officer's shoulder. 
"I was not disrespectful/1 did 
not grip him, I used an open hand 
and it was a very light touch," 
Brown said. "He responded" in a 
very threatening voice, 'Don't 
ever touch me again/ . . . I had 
the distinct impression that„,he 
desperately wanted to harm me." 
That's because, the councilman 
said, he has called for an indepen-
dent investigation of the Police 
Department and backed Green's 
attempt to fire Police Chief John 
Durrant. 
Fox denied that, saying he*sim-
ply.responded to a report of a dis-
turbance. 
He and Petersen filed their re-
ports and sent them to City Attor-
ney! Kevin Bennett, who forward-
ed them to the County Attorney's 
Office. 
A formal grievance, signed by 
about 40 city employees, was filed 
with Wanlass on Tuesday, alleg-
ing that Brown's conduct violated 
free-speech rights by intimidating 
employees, that he has threatened 
to fire employees /who disagree 
with him, and that he "has repeat-
edly degraded, embarrassed, de-
meaned and insulted American. 
Fork employees in public places." 
Wanlass would not comment on 
the grievance, but said he had for-
warded it to Mayor Green and the. 
council. 
It's all groundless nonsense, 
Brown said, and is intended to 
shift the city's focus from the 
council's ongoing debate about 
where to locate a new City'Hall 
Wanless, 'Brown said, is orehes-
tratingvan-attemptto buy land on 
the city's.west edge withoutunput 
from the public or Green. 
"This is the time to bring it to a 
decision, and Carl perceives-that 
I'm in his way," Brown said. 
Christensen disagreed, saying 
the issue is Brown's alleged bully-
ing. 
"He should be reprimanded, at 
least," Christensen said. "I didn't 
sign the grievance, but I intend to 
write abetter of support." 
]KSWESTCOMMUNICATIONS © 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
Rules Text 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claimf 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under 
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all 
the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing 
of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before 
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon 
the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion 
€> 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies All rights reserved. 
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for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rules History 
History: Amended effective November 1, 1997. 
Rules Annotations 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies All rights reserved. 
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63-2-304. Protected records. 
Statute text 
The following records are protected if properly classified by a 
governmental entity: 
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the person 
submitting the trade secret has provided the governmental entity 
with the information specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial information 
obtained from a person if: 
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected 
to result in unfair competitive injury to the person submitting the 
information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity 
to obtain necessary information in the future; 
(b) the person submitting the information has a greater interest 
in prohibiting access than the public in obtaining access; and 
(c) the person submitting the information has provided the 
governmental entity with the information specified in Section 
63-2-308; 
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or prepared by 
a governmental entity to the extent that disclosure would lead to 
financial speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities 
that will interfere with a planned transaction by the governmental 
entity or cause substantial financial injury to the governmental 
entity or state economy; 
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury 
to, or confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual 
competitor of, a commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 
11-13-3(3); 
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future license, 
certification, registration, employment, or academic examinations; 
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair governmental 
procurement proceedings or give an unfair advantage to any person 
proposing to enter into a contract or agreement with a governmental 
entity, except that this subsection does not restrict the right of 
a person to see bids submitted to or by a governmental entity after 
bidding has closed; 
(7) records that would identify real property or the appraisal 
or estimated value of real or personal property, including 
intellectual property, under consideration for public acquisition 
before any rights to the property are acquired unless: 
(a) public interest in obtaining access to the information 
outweighs the governmental entity's need to acquire the property on 
the best terms possible; 
(b) the information has already been disclosed to persons not 
employed by or under a duty of confidentiality to the entity; 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
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(c) in the case of records that would identify property, 
potential sellers of the described property have already learned of 
the governmental entity's plans to acquire the property; or 
(d) in the case of records that would identify the appraisal or 
estimated value of property, the potential sellers have already 
learned of the governmental entity's estimated value of the 
property; 
(8) records prepared in contemplation of sale, exchange, lease, 
rental, or other compensated transaction of real or personal 
property including intellectual property, which, if disclosed prior 
to completion of the transaction, would reveal the appraisal or 
estimated value of the subject property, unless: 
(a) the public interest in access outweighs the interests in 
restricting access, including the governmental entity's interest in 
maximizing the financial benefit of the transaction; or 
(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity, 
appraisals or estimates of the value of the subject property have 
already been disclosed to persons not employed by or under a duty 
of confidentiality to the entity; 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or 
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for 
discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes, if 
release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations 
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, 
or registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, 
disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a 
fair trial or impartial hearing; 
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a 
source who is not generally known outside of government and, in the 
case of a record compiled in the course of an investigation, 
disclose information furnished by a source not generally known 
outside of government if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit 
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known 
outside of government if disclosure would interfere with 
enforcement or audit efforts; 
(10) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the life 
or safety of an individual; 
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security 
of governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental 
record-keeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation 
or use contrary to law or public policy; 
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(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security 
or safety of a correctional facility, or records relating to 
incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole, that would 
interfere with the control and supervision of an offender's 
incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole; 
(13) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommendations made 
to the Board of Pardons and Parole by an employee of or contractor 
for the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole, 
or the Department of Human Services that are based on the 
employeefs or contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of 
any person within the board's jurisdiction; 
(14) records and audit workpapers that identify audit, collection, 
and operational procedures and methods used by the State Tax 
Commission, if disclosure would interfere with audits or 
collections; 
(15) records of a governmental audit agency relating to an ongoing 
or planned audit until the final audit is released; 
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity 
solely in anticipation of litigation that are not available under 
the rules of discovery; 
(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the 
mental impressions or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a governmental entity concerning litigation; 
(18) records of communications between a governmental entity and 
an attorney representing, retained, or employed by the governmental 
entity if the communications would be privileged as provided in 
Section 78-24-8; 
(19) personal files of a legislator, including personal 
correspondence to or from a member of the Legislature, but not 
correspondence that gives notice of legislative action or policy; 
(20) (a) records in the custody or control of the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel, that, if disclosed, would 
reveal a particular legislator's contemplated legislation or 
contemplated course of action before the legislator has elected to 
support the legislation or course of action, or made the 
legislation or course of action public; and 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, a "Request For Legislation" 
submitted to the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
is a public document unless a legislator submits the "Request For 
Legislation" with a request that it be maintained as a protected 
record until such time as the legislator elects to make the 
legislation or course of action public; 
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel or the Office of the 
Legislative Fiscal Analyst and research findings prepared in 
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response to these requests; 
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public; 
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strategy about 
collective bargaining or pending litigation; 
(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and analyses 
of loss occurrences that may be covered by the Risk Management 
Fund, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, or similar divisions in other governmental entities; 
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a 
personal recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy, or disclosure is not in the public interest; 
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehistoric, 
paleontological, or biological resources that if known would 
jeopardize the security of those resources or of valuable historic, 
scientific, educational, or cultural information; 
(27) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of 
the records would conflict with the fiduciary obligations of the 
agency; 
(28) records of a public institution of higher education regarding 
tenure evaluations, appointments, applications for admissions, 
retention decisions, and promotions, which could be properly 
discussed in a meeting closed in accordance with Title 52, Chapter 
4, Open and Public Meetings, provided that records of the final 
decisions about tenure, appointments, retention, promotions, or 
those students admitted, may not be classified as protected under 
this section; 
(29) records of the governor's office, including budget 
recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy statements, that 
if disclosed would reveal the governor's contemplated policies or 
contemplated courses of action before the governor has implemented 
or rejected those policies or courses of action or made them 
public; 
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst 
relating to budget analysis, revenue estimates, and fiscal notes of 
proposed legislation before issuance of the final recommendations 
in these areas; 
(31) records provided by the United States or by a government 
entity outside the state that are given to the governmental entity 
with a requirement that they be managed as protected records if the 
providing entity certifies that the record would not be subject to 
public disclosure if retained by it; 
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed portion of 
a meeting of a public body except as provided in Section 52-4-7; 
(33) records that would reveal the contents of settlement 
negotiations but not including final settlements or empirical data 
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to the extent that they are not otherwise exempt from disclosure; 
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the decision-making 
process by an administrative law judge, a member of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, or a member of any other body charged by law 
with performing a quasi-judicial function; 
(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding assistance 
or incentives offered by or requested from a governmental entity 
for the purpose of encouraging a person to expand or locate a 
business in Utah, but only if disclosure would result in actual 
economic harm to the person or place the governmental entity at a 
competitive disadvantage, but this section may not be used to 
restrict access to a record evidencing a final contract; 
(36) materials to which access must be limited for purposes of 
securing or maintaining the governmental entity's proprietary 
protection of intellectual property rights including patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets; 
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a governmental 
entity, including a public institution of higher education, and 
other information concerning the donation that could reasonably be 
expected to reveal the identity of the donor, provided that: 
(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing; 
(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privileges relating 
to the donation may not be classified protected by the governmental 
entity under this subsection; and 
(c) except for public institutions of higher education, the 
governmental unit to which the donation is made is primarily 
engaged in educational, charitable, or artistic endeavors, and has 
no regulatory or legislative authority over the donor, a member of 
his immediate family, or any entity owned or controlled by the 
donor or his immediate family; and 
(38) the following records of a public institution of education, 
which have been developed, discovered, or received by or on behalf 
of faculty, staff, employees, or students of the institution: 
unpublished lecture notes, unpublished research notes and data, 
unpublished manuscripts, creative works in process, scholarly 
correspondence, and confidential information contained in research 
proposals. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect 
the ownership of a record. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-304, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 21; 
1992, ch. 228, § 3; 1992, ch. 280, § 28; 1994, ch. 13, § 5; 1994, 
ch. 114, § 1; 1995, ch. 133, § 2; 1996, ch. 79, § 81; 1997, ch. 
234, § 4. 
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63-2-801. Criminal penalties. 
(1) (a) A public employee or other person who has lawful access 
to any private, controlled, or protected record under this chapter, 
and who intentionally discloses or provides a copy of a private, 
controlled, or protected record to any person knowing that such 
disclosure is prohibited, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(a) that 
the actor released private, controlled, or protected information in 
the reasonable belief that the disclosure of the information was 
necessary to expose a violation of law involving government 
corruption, abuse of office, or misappropriation of public funds or 
property. 
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(a) that 
the record could have lawfully been released to the recipient if it 
had been properly classified. 
(2) (a) A person who by false pretenses, bribery, or theft, 
gains access to or obtains a copy of any private, controlled, or 
protected record to which he is not legally entitled is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) No person shall be guilty under Subsection (2) (a) who 
receives the record, information, or copy after the fact and 
without prior knowledge of or participation in the false pretenses, 
bribery, or theft. 
(3) A public employee who intentionally refuses to release a 
record the disclosure of which the employee knows is required by 
law or by final unappealed order from a governmental entity, the 
records committee, or a court, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-801, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 38; 
1992, ch. 280, § 46. 
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63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of 
liability - Effect of waiver of immunity - Exclusive remedy -
Joinder of employee - Limitations on personal liability. 
Statute text 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically 
provided, may be construed as an admission or denial of liability 
or responsibility by or for governmental entities or their 
employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to 
be sued is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined 
as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any 
waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this 
chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute 
liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely 
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity or 
employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under 
this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee for an 
injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive 
remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action 
or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave 
rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; 
or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth 
in Subsection 63-30-36 (3) (c) . 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may 
be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts 
or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
History 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, § 3; 1983, ch. 129, 
§ 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 1. 
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63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act 
or omission of employee - Exceptions. 
Statute text 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is 
abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of 
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable 
cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is 
negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob 
violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, 
any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or 
mining operation, or any activity authorized by the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding 
for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural 
disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm 
systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; 
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(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, 
Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition to all other immunities 
granted by law. 
History 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 
1989, ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2; 
1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, § 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, 
ch. 264, § 1. 
Annotations 
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76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of the offense" 
defined* 
Statute text 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the 
offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of 
the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-501, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-1-501. 
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76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer - Penalty. 
St-atute text 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that 
he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within 
the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or 
another correctional facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the 
sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds that the 
interests of justice would be best served and makes specific 
findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record. 
Histocy 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.4, enacted by L. 1974, ch. 32, § 32; 
1987, ch. 23, § 1; 1998, ch. 172, § 1. 
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76-9-102. Disorderly conduct. 
Statute text 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to 
move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or 
physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be 
heard in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any 
place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has 
access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and 
the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office 
buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense 
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an 
infraction. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 76-9-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-9-102; 1999, ch. 20, § 1. 
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